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Negotiating EU Law 
Particularities and Conclusions 
 
I.   Introduction 
1.  Importance of good negotiating skills 
In Brussels nothing drops from the sky: not a directive, regulation, deci-
sion, green book, white book, recommendation, opinion, communication 
and so on.  Everything is the result of the EU specific decision making 
process. This process is directed and controlled by negotiations. We can 
influence it to a high degree if we effectively participate in these negotia-
tions.  
Effective participation in EU decision making means above all to take an 
active part in and to influence the far-reaching EU legislation. A regulation 
on environmental standards for example - after difficult negotiations 
adopted in Brussels today - will be published in the EU's Official Journal 
tomorrow. The day after tomorrow this regulation will represent directly 
applicable legislation for the EU's nearly 500 million citizens. If we want to 
make sure that our interests, the interests of our institution or our national 
interests are taken into account, we have to negotiate effectively. That’s 
one reason why good negotiating is so important in the EU.  
There is however another reason. Good bargaining in the EU is much more 
than pushing through our own interests, as the negotiations in the EU have 
to reconcile the very different interests of all participants, especially the 
interests of all Member States. Only if all participants negotiate well, can 
the negotiation result be acceptable to all EU partners in the long run. Most 
of the critical developments in the EU from the empty-chair policy in the 
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sixties to the veto situations in the eighties and the crises in recent years 
may be explained as the result of negotiating mistakes. This is why good 
negotiating skills form a fundamental basis of the functioning and stability 
of the EU. 
2.  Becoming successful or frustrated  
Hundreds of negotiations are taking place every week in all kinds of EU 
bodies. It is always amazing to see that half of the negotiators enjoys nego-
tiating and is successful in doing so, while the others do not succeed and 
are disappointed and frustrated.  
On the one hand there are negotiators who know what they are doing on the 
European stage and who also know their importance. They assert the inter-
ests they represent as much as possible in EU decisions. Nevertheless, their 
relations with the other delegates are good. On the other hand, there are 
those who keep getting frustrated. They do not succeed in negotiations and 
they are unpopular with their bargaining partners. It is amazing to realize 
that the second group, the unsuccessful, listless and disappointed, includes 
many negotiators with outstanding technical knowledge. These are negotia-
tors who are obviously experienced, skilful and successful in negotiations 
at the national or international bilateral and multilateral levels. Despite 
these qualifications, they are astonishingly ineffective and helpless at EU 
level. It is as if the engine of a car runs at a great number of revolutions but 
the power does not reach the wheels. That is, something is wrong with the 
gearbox of the car. 
This is why the latter do not like to participate in EU negotiations. Most of 
them do not even try to hide it. They show their frustration and make the 
EU responsible for their failure. They say that the other delegates do not 
understand them. They say that the European Commission representatives 
are always working against them. They say that, unlike all the other par-
ticipants, they are not provided with the necessary information and docu-
ments. To them EU policy-making seems to be obscure, undemocratic and 
Kafkaesque anyway. As a consequence, they are the worst communicators 
of EU ideas and ideals. They even spoil them. 
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This dichotomy is remarkable only at first glance. If you analyse the bar-
gaining techniques of the delegates in detail, it soon becomes clear that the 
ones who work successfully in EU bodies are those who take into account 
the characteristics of the EU's decision-making process, while the others 
don’t.  A great number of the negotiators have no idea or at best a nebulous 
one about these particularities. Some of them are not interested in them at 
all. If the one and only secret to being successful the EU level is to take 
into account the particularities of EU decision making, we must try to bet-
ter understand them and increase our ability to draw consequences from 
that for our negotiating approach.
1 
Aiming at this, we shall focus on the legislation of the Council and Com-
mission bodies. They are the bodies in which the numerous national dele-
gates, civil servants on technical level, experts, senior officials and 
ministers, negotiate directly every day. They are the bodies in which our 
students will negotiate most likely. While there is good political science 
literature concerning these bodies, there is much less literature giving the 
view of experienced insiders and practically useful hints. The Council and 
its preparatory bodies as well as the Commission’s working parties seem to 
be the most opaque und secretive bodies of the EU.
2 The Presidency, the 
Commission and the national governmental actors negotiate behind closed 
doors.
3 Here the negotiations and the decision making cannot be observed 
directly by outsiders. The political science depends on indirect information. 
This is different for the European Parliament and its bodies. They are inter-
ested to „go public” with their politics and their negotiations.  
To make EU negotiators efficient and effective we want to bring these par-
ticularities to our attention and increase our ability to draw consequences 
from that for our bargaining approach. With the insiders view we have to 
make some considerations and give recommendations that may at a first 
glance seem to be self-evident and some of them even trivial. We accept 
 
1   For negotiating skills in general see e g. Fisher, Roger; Ury, William, Getting to Yes. Negotiat-
ing an agreement without giving in, London, 2003. 
2   Westlake, Martin; Galloway, David, The Council of the European Union, London, 2006, p.367. 
3   Altides, Christina, Making EU Politics Public, Baden-Baden, 2009, p.23. 
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this, convinced the considerations and recommendations will be useful for 
the players involved directly or indirectly. 
II.   The particularities of decision making in EU bo-
dies: consequences for negotiating 
1.   Multitude of bodies and persons involved: multitude of possi-
bilities to interfere and to act 
If you want to buy a used car, you look for a suitable offer in newspaper 
ads. Then you meet with the seller and negotiate the price with him. You 
may also consult a car expert for his opinion on the condition of the car and 
on the appropriate price. Generally, no one else is involved in the negotia-
tions. 
This is very different in EU negotiations. For each member state, every 
other member state is a negotiating partner. That makes 26 partners. There 
are many more parties involved in the negotiation: The European Commis-
sion initiates the negotiation with its proposal in the Council and the Par-
liament. The European Parliament plays an important role in the process. 
The Presidency, too, influences the process and the outcome. Negotiations 
do not only take place at the level where you have to negotiate. If you ne-
gotiate an item e. g. in an EU working party, the same item will be dealt 
with also at other levels, i.e. in the Permanent Representatives Committee 
(Coreper), the Council’s senior preparatory body, and in the Council itself 
as well as in other committees. So the number of bodies and persons in-
volved multiplies.  
 The negotiations of the working party are prepared first by the Presidency 
on its own, then with the Council secretariat and then in a joint briefing of 
the Presidency, Council Secretariat and Commission. Each participant, 
each individual delegate of each member state is influenced by many other 
persons and bodies interested in the negotiated issue and may influence the 
others. The multitude of players seems to be confusing. So let us systemize 
them a little bit and have a short look at them: Council activity: Here the 
negotiating bodies start with the working parties at the lowest negotiating 
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level, then the Committee of the Permanent Re- presentatives (Coreper) 
and other committees at the medium level, then the ministers at the high 
level (Council) and finally the highest level of the heads of state and gov-
ernment (European Council). There is also the Council Secretariat, its Le-
gal Service and the 27 Permanent Representations of the Member States 
designed to facilitate negotiating in the Council. Commission activity: 
There are numerous Commission units and a hierarchy up to and including 
the directors and directors general, the chefs de cabinet and the “Commis-
sion” as a political body, and there are numerous Commission working par-
ties and committees. 
European Parliament activity: There are up to 750 members, each of them 
with his or her own staff, parliamentary groups and more than 20 commit-
tees, in the committees one “rapporteur” and several “shadow rapporteurs” 
for each proposal and finally there is the plenary. There are more bodies at 
EU level designed to facilitate negotiating e. g.  the Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions as well as many interests 
groups including lobbying services and NGOs. We must to keep in mind 
that at the Member State level there are also numerous bodies relevant for 
EU negotiating.  In particular, there are the national parliaments and their 
committees, the leading ministry and the other involved ministries, the bod-
ies of national EU policy coordination, political parties, press and national 
lobbying services. There is of course neither the need nor the possibility to 
use all of these players in all EU negotiations. You should however be 
aware that they exist. You should also think about whether and how you 
may be able to use them. If you don’t make use of all negotiation possibili-
ties, your negotiating partners will use them to achieve their own goals. 
1.1  Best places to negotiate 
 Negotiations take place in the conference room. To us, this seems to be the 
normal thing: It is in the conference room that delegates exchange their ar-
guments. In this room, working parties and the Coreper finalise the work of 
their respective levels and the Council finalises definitively its decision-
making process on a proposal. Therefore, it is obvious that many delegates 
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concentrate their negotiating skills and their negotiating effort on the length 
of the meeting and on the conference room.  
However, only a small fraction of the persons and bodies involved in an 
EU negotiation is sitting in the Brussels meeting room where you negotiate: 
just the other delegates of the same Working party, the Presidency, the 
Commission and the General Secretariat of the Council with their respec-
tive staff. This makes it clear that our negotiating possibilities are very li- 
mited in an EU conference room. There are more reasons for that:  
Now 27 delegations aside from the Presidency, Commission and Council 
Secretariat with their staff, the state and the prospects of the negotiation are 
rather difficult to assess in the conference room. The delegates don’t bar-
gain directly with each other. They don’t speak directly to each other but 
rather via microphone and headset. Often their “dialogues” are even medi-
ated by one or more interpreters. More and more often they can’t see each 
other due to the increased number of participants and the distance between 
them.  Sometimes it may even be difficult to know which delegation has 
the floor. Many delegates in a working party do not know each other per-
sonally. This was different in the past with fewer Member States. Among 
the few delegations the atmosphere in the EU conference room was famil-
iar and often friendly. It facilitated coming to a consensus in difficult situa-
tions. If anywhere, this is the case today in the Coreper and in the Special 
Committee on Agriculture (SCA). Their members meet every week for bi-
lateral negotiations often lasting more than one day. They belong to their 
committee for years and sometimes for more than a decade.
4 
One of the main bottle necks of the problem is the lack of time in the meet-
ing room. During a meeting of 27 delegations each delegate has much too 
little time to bring forward his position, interests and arguments. At all ne-
gotiation levels up to the ministers, the speakers are restricted to two mi- 
nutes in principle.
5 The limited availability of conference rooms and inter-
 
4   Westlake and Galloway, p.426. 
5   “... the Presidency shall … indicate to delegations the maximum length of their interventions … 
In most cases interventions should not exceed two minutes.” Section 9, Working Methods for an 
enlarged Council, Annex V to the Council’s Rules of Procedure, Council Decision 2009/937/EU 
of 1 December 2009 adopting the Council's Rules of Procedure, OJ 2009 L 325/35). 
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preters as well as the limited time and patience of the other 26 delegates 
makes it hard to speak longer.  It is now customary for only a very small 
part of EU negotiations to take place in the meeting room. Before and after 
each meeting there are a number of possibilities to influence decision mak-
ing very effectively.  “Each Council meeting is the – relatively short lived – 
culmination of lengthy preparatory work undertaken by many specialised 
working parties and committees and completed by Coreper”.
6 It is the short 
starting point to a long period of follow-up operations. What applies to 
Council meetings also applies to the meetings of all of its preparatory bod-
ies. By far the most important parts of meetings often occur outside the 
conference room. We must not limit our negotiating efforts to the length of 
the meeting and to the conference room.  
In an EU now encompassing 27 Member States, negotiations have become 
a management task, most of which has to be conducted outside the meeting 
room, e.g. started by reflections in the office of the negotiator in his capital, 
continued by negotiations in the offices of the Presidency, Commission 
services and other delegations. It is our job to bring together all the relevant 
information, to see and understand the interests of the other parties in-
volved and analyse what possibilities we have for exerting influence. We 
must also choose arguments which are useful or at least not harmful to our 
interests, to form networks and – in bilateral contacts – to win over other 
delegations, and all of the aforementioned parties including the EU, na-
tional governments and NGO’s for our interests. During a short meeting we 
have few possibilities to effectively negotiate, if only for time reasons. 
Those who essentially restrict their negotiations to the official meetings 
forfeit the most and best opportunities to exert influence.  
1.2   Best level and best time to negotiate 
Many delegates negotiating in an EU working party take their task too 
lightly. They are hardly interested in bringing up the interests they repre-
 
6   The former Secretary-General of the Council Jürgen Trumpf, stated it long before the enlarge-
ment; meanwhile the number of Member states nearly doubled. Trumpf-Piris-Report “Operation 
of the Council with an enlarged Union in prospect”, Report by the  set up by the Secretary-
General of the Council. Brussels: Council of the European Union, Doc. SN 2139/99, 10.03.1999. 
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sent. They feel there is no need for that, since there is always a negotiating 
hierarchy above them: What I do not achieve at my level will certainly be 
achieved at the next level that is to say in the Coreper. If not there, my min-
ister will achieve it at his level in the Council: For the EU legislative body 
is – together with the Parliament – the Council acting always at ministerial 
level.
7  
However, this is a false and dangerous conclusion. Once the required ma-
jority is achieved after difficult bargaining in a working party or in the 
Coreper, a minister will have little chance if any to introduce changes at 
Council level. In most cases, he cannot even stop the decision-making 
process at this level, let alone turn it around as he wishes. This is a conse-
quence of the EU specific procedures. Once a Commission proposal has 
found the necessary majority in a working party, it is passed on to the 
Coreper. It will be put on the agenda of the next Coreper meeting. It will 
generally be included in the so-called „Roman I-Part” of the agenda. All 
proposals thus entered as so-called “Roman I-items” will normally not be 
discussed in Coreper. Unlike the “Roman II-items”, they are mostly items 
in transit. After the Coreper meeting these proposals are submitted to the 
Council. Normally it will be put on the agenda for the next meeting. It will 
be included not in the regular agenda, but on an annex to the Council’s 
agenda, the so-called “list of ‘A’-items”.  Once again all of these items are 
normally just items in transit: The ministers adopt all items on this list en 
bloc without any discussion. The legal effect is the same as for the items 
placed on the regular agenda and adopted following debate in the Council 
itself, the so-called “B-items”.
8 Most ministers don’t even know exactly 
what is on the list of “A-items” they adopt. Often these items are not the 
responsibility of these particular ministers and of the respective Council 
formation. 
9  
 
7   Art. 16 par. 1 and 2 TEU. 
8   Westlake and Galloway, p.264. 
9   The former British minister Alan Clark recorded in his “Diaries” the view, “that, not really, it 
makes the slightest difference to the conclusions of a meeting what ministers say at it. Every-
thing is decided, hors-traded off by officials at Coreper and working parties ... The ministers ar-
rive on the scene at the last minute, hot, tired, ill or drunk (sometimes all of these together), read 
out their pieces and depart.” Clark, p.139. This statement holds true even long before the last 
enlargements; meanwhile the number of countries nearly doubled. 
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1.3 First  conclusions 
We have to recognize that very effective negotiating is both necessary and 
possible irrespective of the conference room and length of the meeting. We 
must take action as soon as possible because if an opinion has been formed 
against us in the first place it is always hard and often impossible to change 
it again. It is important to recognize ways to make the best use of all these 
possibilities to exert influence including establishing and using contacts, 
making phone calls, passing on papers to other negotiators, “helping” them 
to understand and support our interests. Due to the lack of time it may be 
helpful to draft an amendment to the text which is discussed in our group, 
bringing our ideas and intentions forward in the language in which the 
Presidency has tabled its own draft. So we must not limit our negotiating 
efforts to the meeting and to the conference room. In other words, effective 
EU negotiations are not the result of rhetoric, body language or diplomatic 
behaviour used in the meeting room. These are management tasks. By far 
the most important part of it has to be done outside the conference room, 
starting at home by making all possible contacts in our own office. We 
have to act on time: Once bodies or people involved have formed an opin-
ion, it is too late to bring up our interests. It is never too early to negotiate, 
but often too late.  The lowest negotiation level is the most important one. 
If we don’t make use of all possibilities to our own benefit, our partners 
will use them for their own interests.   
2.  Voting by majority, weighting of the member state votes  
2.1   Qualified majority or blocking minority: we have to win allies 
In international negotiations, important decisions can only be made if all 
participants agree. Yet the EU takes a different approach. Here, negotia-
tions are generally concluded when a qualified majority has been formed
10. 
The 27 Member States have 345 votes altogether. For a decision to be 
taken, 255 votes must be cast for the proposal in question. This is called a 
qualified majority.  The other existing majority elements - majority of 
 
10   Art. 16 par. 3 TEU. 
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members of the Council representing at least 62 % of the Union’s popula-
tion - are not relevant in practice. If we look at it the other way round: 91 
votes against a proposal including abstentions, means the proposal in ques-
tion will not be adopted. This is the so-called blocking minority
11. 
In fact, today a qualified majority suffices for most EU decisions. This has 
been the case for twenty years regarding the Common Trade Policy, the 
Common Agricultural Policy and some other policy fields. The possibility 
of decision making by a qualified majority now increasingly prevails in 
most of the other policy fields too. The change from unanimity to qualified 
majority voting has constantly been in flux, extended by the Single Euro-
pean Act, the Treaty of Maastricht, the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Treaty of 
Nice and the Treaty of Lisbon. Now in principle unanimity is retained only 
for decisions of the European Council
12 and at the Council for a few areas 
including tax, foreign affairs, defense and social security. 
For a negotiator, it is important to note that in practice the qualified major-
ity is important even in those fields where unanimity is still legally re-
quired. This is because in these negotiations too, the participants notice 
when a proposal is backed by a qualified majority. This brings political 
pressure to bear on the other Member States. In practice a single member 
state or even some Member States cannot permanently object to a decision 
favoured by a qualified majority. This is even shown by the highest level at 
the European Council: In extremely difficult situations, decisions resisted 
by one or the other member state will not persist when the European Coun-
cil conclusions are supported by a clear majority. An essential conclusion 
from this for our conduct of negotiations is: We must realize that we cannot 
achieve anything alone in the EU. As a single delegation and as a single 
member state we cannot prevent anything alone. We have to win allies in 
order to get a qualified majority for a decision we want or to form a block-
ing minority against a decision we want to avoid.  
 
11   From 1st of april 2017 at the latest a qualified majority shall be defined as at least 55 % of the 
members of the Council, comprising at least fifteen of them and representing at least 65 % of the 
population of the Union (double majority). A blocking minority must include at least four Coun-
cil members. The other future elements governing the qualified majority are laid down in Art. 
238 par. 2 TFEU.  
12   Art. 15 par. 4 TEU. 
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This holds true for the bigger Member States as well. To reach a qualified 
majority, the six biggest Member States still need a lot of the medium-sized 
or smaller Member States as they alone have only 170 votes in total. On the 
other hand, even the group of the bigger Member States needs four of them 
to prevent a decision because their votes only suffice for a blocking mino 
rity of 91 votes. The delegates of the bigger Member States often run the 
risk of forgetting this
13. 
We must learn to think in terms of majorities and blocking minorities. In 
order to use our options at the bargaining table and to protect us from un-
pleasant surprises, we must always be aware of the respective majority 
conditions in the EU bodies. We must know if a majority is emerging for or 
against us or if it is possible to at least reach a blocking minority. Every 
good EU negotiator therefore, has a kind of calculator in his head con-
stantly recording the number of votes
14  
2.2   How to win allies 
We must work for establishing good human relations with our bargaining 
partners. For this we have to be active. There are multiple ways to approach 
them and we should use them all, if possible. Joining the meeting of a 
working party for the first time we should introduce ourselves to the repre-
sentatives of the Presidency, the Commission, the Council’s General Secre-
tariat and all delegations and hand out our business cards. We should greet 
each of them personally, if possible, at every meeting. We should offer and 
provide information and contacts. We may call and visit. We may go to the 
canteen, coffee bar, pizzeria or a pub together with members of other dele-
gations. All of this seems trivial, yet these activities are a precondition for 
winning delegations. Even though these are important activities, they re-
main neglected. If we don’t cooperate with the others, they may side 
against us. 
 
 
13   See below chapter 2.3. 
14   For the official voting calculator see the website of the Council (http://europa.eu/index_en.htm). 
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2.2.1   Best  time   
It is easiest to win somebody as a friend when you don't need him urgently. 
The same is true if you want to win somebody as your negotiating ally.  
Indeed, this insight is not particular to EU bargaining. However, it is so of-
ten neglected in EU negotiations that it is worth being mentioned. 
We have discussed the amount of players as a particularity of EU decision 
making. When there are many players involved, it becomes more difficult 
to develop a common position. What is worse, once they have painfully 
made up their minds and agreed upon a position, it will become much 
harder, often even impossible to change it.
15 If an opinion or - even worse -
a majority has formed against us it is too late to effectively bring in our in-
terests. It is never too early but often too late to win allies. So we must take 
action as soon as possible  
2.2.2   Best  arguments   
It is useful to have good personal relations with the other players. However, 
nobody will become our ally just because we are liked as a person. Every 
player involved in EU bargaining is driven by his interests. So we have to 
address these interests. If possible, we must try to include the interests of 
our partners in our own argumentation.  
If the farm minister of a Mediterranean country wants the EU to help his 
olive-growers it isn’t helpful to complain specifically about the hardship of 
the olive-growers in his own country. If he does, the northern Member 
States concerned about budgetary burdens and the competitive position of 
their butter producers, as well as other olive-producing countries may be 
against him. This is because they want to prevent giving a special advan-
tage to the olive-oil farmers from other countries. They do not necessarily 
want to alleviate the hardship of these producers as they would benefit 
from the market situation if these competitors ceased farming. So the Min-
ister would be better served complaining about the hardship of all olive-
growers in the EU or to ask for sales promotion based on a research opin-
ion of the WHO recommending the consumption of olive oil. 
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It is much better to include in our argumentation the interests of as many 
negotiating partners as possible so as not to exclude other delegations and 
their interests. Additionally, it is convincing if we include the interests of 
the EU itself in our own argumentation. Sometimes you hear arguments 
that are not only useless but dangerous and harmful. This may happen 
when a delegate violates the mandatory requirements of EU legislation. 
Such requirements include the ban on discrimination and the acquis of the 
internal market. Many delegates like to present legal arguments attacking 
or supporting a controversial position. They generally attack a proposal of 
the Commission as illegal. Such legal arguments are likely convincing only 
for delegations already likeminded. All other delegations will not follow 
them.  
If a delegate asks for an opinion of a Legal Service he should be aware that 
there are two different Legal Services involved in the negotiation. If he ad-
dresses the Legal Service of the Commission the answer is always predict-
able as this Legal Service will always defend the Commission’s proposal. It 
is its duty, and it has given its official consent to the proposal long before. 
If the delegate addresses the Legal Service of the Council the answer may 
be more in line with its position. Even this Legal Service is disappointing 
when you really need its help: “Whenever a political orientation finds a 
qualified majority in a Council body the Legal Service, if illegality is not 
evident, must not give an opinion on the solution that is in line with this 
orientation”.
16  
2.3  Weighting of votes: big vs. small, small vs. big? 
The usual principle underlying international organisations is the sovereign 
equality of states: one state, one vote. Here again the EU takes a particular 
approach. Its Member States are formally unequally represented. They have 
 
15   Fisher and Ury, p.7. 
16   “Dans la mesure où une orientation politique recueillant une majorité qualifiée des members du 
Conseil s’est dégagée lors du Conseil précité, il n’est pas lieu pour le Service juridique, en 
l’absence d’illégalité manifeste, d’exprimer un avis sur la solution qui comporte cette orienta-
tion.” quoted from a note of the Director General of the Council Legal Service to the President 
and the delegations of the Special Committee on Agriculture (SCA), a senior preparatory body of 
the Council). 
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unequal numbers of votes: from 3 votes for Malta as the smallest member 
state up to 29 for each of the four biggest Member States. The weighting of 
member state votes is a key characteristic of the decision-making process in 
the EU.  
It is easier for us to achieve a qualified majority or blocking minority if we 
can win the support of the large Member States for our position than if we 
are only supported by small Member States. Winning the Italian delegate 
provides the support of 29 votes, winning the delegate from Luxembourg 
provides only 4 votes. Therefore it is obvious that most delegates try to ob-
tain the support of large Member States. Some of them treat their col-
leagues from small Member States as “quantitées négligeables“. At best, 
they canvass the small Member States’ support merely as a marginal by-
product as each vote brings them closer to their aim. In fact, some dele-
gates’ behaviour shows that the small and medium-sized Member States 
are not really taken seriously as negotiating partners. Astonishingly there is 
no difference whether these delegates themselves represent small, medium 
or larger Member States. If, for instance, the ministers express their view in 
the Council, many seats are taken when the large Member States, and the 
Commission and the Presidency have the floor. Many assume, however, 
that they can do without the contributions of smaller Member States and 
use that time for a phone call or a stop at the coffee bar. This is not only 
impolite, but it is also inefficient and harmful to the negotiating process.  
2.3.1    Small is beautiful and influential 
Winning the support and the votes of the small and medium Member States 
pays off. They are important negotiating partners and sometimes more use-
ful and reliable to us than the bigger ones. 20 of the 27 Member States are 
small or medium-sized. In negotiations they can exert an important influ-
ence. Since the beginning of integration, the small Member States have 
been “overrepresented”.  Each of them has relatively more votes, more 
Commissioners, more members in the EP, more members of staff in the 
institutions and more speaking time in each meeting than a large Member 
State. Thus they have more relative influence in the negotiations than the 
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large states. They “punch above their weight”.
17 Luxembourg, for example, 
has four votes. This is one vote for each 125,000 of its 500,000 inhabitants. 
Hungary as a medium-sized Member State has 12 votes, approximately one 
vote for 1 million of its 10 million inhabitants. Germany as the biggest 
Member States has 29 votes, this is one vote for each 2.8 million of its 82 
million inhabitants. So Luxembourg has, relatively speaking, 8 times more 
votes than Hungary and 28 times more than Germany.  
Until the time of voting, however, the small Member States are even more 
“privileged”.
18  In the meeting room they have the same negotiating rights 
and possibilities as the largest Member State:  number of delegates, micro-
phones, the same possibilities to intervene and the same time to speak. Out-
side the conference room, they have the same negotiating options as a large 
state. They have access to all the other delegations, to the Commission 
units and to the Presidency. They have “their” Commissioners with whom 
they have particularly good access. Often a small Member State is less di-
rectly concerned by the negotiated proposal than the large Member States. 
In this case its argument appears to be less self-interested, more credible 
and in accordance with the common interest. Its capital is credibility and a 
realistic approach. In addition, they often have a popularity bonus with the 
other delegates, which benefits negotiations. That is why the delegates of 
smaller Member States are often the leading characters in a working party. 
We should join them. Small is beautiful.  
The support by smaller Member States can be very valuable. If a small 
Member State is only marginally or not concerned at all, it is easier for us 
to win its support for our position. This is especially useful in difficult ne-
gotiating situations. For example, a difficult negotiating situation exists 
when we are the only delegation to advocate a concern. From the point of 
view of negotiating tactics it is of great benefit if a small member state, ir-
respective of the number of its votes, with its credibility takes the floor and 
expresses support or at least understanding for our isolated position. While 
 
17   Tallberg, Jonas, Bargaining power in the European Council, in: JCMS 2008, Vol.46, No. 3, 
p.685-708, p.693. 
18   Hayes-Renshaw, Fiona; Walace, Helen, The Council of Ministers, Basingstroke and New York 
2006, p.72. 
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the self-interested position of an individual Member State can be easily 
dismissed with reference to the Union’s interest, the support of the smallest 
Member States creates the impression that the Union’s interest could be 
involved. This will be taken seriously during the negotiations. Therefore, it 
pays off to approach every delegation, especially the small ones. Win the 
smaller Member States as your ally! They are good allies.  
On the other hand, the smaller Member States register polite and impolite 
acts very well. Maybe their delegates are especially sensitive to this point 
and react in a very emotional way. If one or more of the “large ones” treat a 
small one badly, this mostly results in the solidarity between all smaller 
states. The last enlargement has increased the amount of the smaller Mem-
ber States considerably. That is why it has become even more important for 
the bigger Member States to appreciate them as important negotiating part-
ners. Otherwise, they run the risk of opposition by all of the smaller ones: 
“Don’t bully us we are so small and fragile!”
19 Sometimes such an impres-
sion of bullying has no foundation at all, but a small Member State may 
claim in order to buttress its position which is known as “playing with 
fire”. This is a strain on the negotiating climate and the decision-making 
process. The media too, is also very quick in taking the side of the small 
countries and defending them against the large ones even if it is the media 
of large Member States. In practice, this can be a severe burden on the ne-
gotiations. The bigger the Member State is, the more it has to know this 
risk. For sometimes even large Member States feel invited to play this card 
against a still bigger country.  
2.3.2    Big is useful 
Generally the delegates of smaller have a high realism and low compla-
cence. They know the advantages larger Member States have in EU nego-
tiations. Large Member States have a higher number of national EU staff. 
Statistically their staff is better trained, skilled and prepared. Due to their 
higher scientific and administrative capabilities, they have better informa-
tion on the negotiated items. They often have a dense national network and 
 
19   Thorhallsson, Baldur, The Role of Smaller States in the European Union, London, 2000, p.239. 
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more contacts in the EU network. The accession of 12 smaller and me-
dium-sized countries has probably reinforced the influence of large Mem-
ber States, as issues that previously were settled in formal plenary sessions 
are increasingly resolved behind closed doors in informal trilateral negotia-
tions between Presidency, Commission and the most “essential” 
es
20. The capital of the large Member States is information and network. 
The smaller Member States are skilful enough to utilize these advantages 
for their own interests. Experience shows that we don’t have to explain 
their opportunities to them. On the other hand, we have to remind the me-
dium and large countries from time to time how useful smaller countries 
can be as allies.  
2.4   The real worth of a blocking minority  
It is our aim to achieve a qualified majority for our interests. If it is not pos-
sible to reach this majority we must strive to prevent a qualified majority 
against us. In other words, we must at least reach a blocking minority. If a 
blocking minority is thus achieved, the Commission proposal cannot be 
adopted. As a consequence we have gained time and we can approach the 
chairmanship, our partners and the Commission from a stronger negotiating 
position. 91 votes are all that is required for this. These are relatively easy 
to achieve as our arguments can only be directed at the deficiencies of the 
Commission proposal. We can expect that several delegations will not see 
the proposal as the best possible. At this stage, we need not persuade our 
negotiating partners to decide on another regulation with us.  
Then, with a blocking minority we have reached an important intermediate 
objective but nothing else. For a blocking minority is always at risk. It is 
"volatile" and always breaks up in the end: The only open question is when 
it will break up and to whose benefit or detriment. It becomes worthless in 
the course of time. The vast majority of partners are working toward break-
ing up the blocking minority as soon as possible and at the lowest possible 
price. Among those partners are the two negotiators wielding particularly 
strong negotiating power: the Presidency and the Commission. To this end, 
 
20   Tallberg, 2008, p.691. 
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the Presidency and the Commission can amend the proposal to the benefit 
or detriment of individual negotiators; they can also make concessions, dis-
tribute “gifts” and exert pressure. 
Thus, we always have to reckon with majority proportions changing to our 
disadvantage. Positions of Member States vary in the course of time. We 
should not see them as immutable fixed points. It is amazing how some 
delegations will all of  the sudden advocate nearly the contrary of what they 
had fiercely advocated in the last meeting. For this reason we must become 
active at an early stage. If there is any suspicion, we must approach the 
“risky” partner right away. Once he has “given in” to the majority it is too 
late.  
2.5  Unanimous decision-making despite the option of a majority     
decision  
“The Council shall act by a qualified majority except where the Treaties 
provide otherwise.”
21  We realized this as a particularity of the EU decision 
making with considerable consequences for negotiators. In practice, EU 
decisions are mostly adopted unanimously even if majority decisions are 
legally possible. Most decisions, which can be adopted by a qualified ma-
jority, are adopted unanimously.
22  . For example, in national parliaments 
the slightest majority suffices to make decisions. If a majority has been 
reached in the EU negotiations, a vote can be taken as the negotiations have 
been successfully concluded. Yet in practice, they are mostly continued 
with the aim of reaching a broader majority, and if possible unanimity.  
Asking for an explanation of this particularity you will normally hear an 
altruistic one:  By adopting a decision unanimously we avoid the decision-
making process involving sacrifices; nobody has been passed over and no-
body has lost face. But this explanation is too altruistic to be realistic. In a 
national parliament, the majority never feels for the outvoted: It celebrates 
its triumph. The explanation for this particularity is again the self-interest 
of the negotiators: If a member state votes against a decision, its further 
 
21   Art. 16 par. 3 TEU. 
22   Westlake and Galloway, p.225. 
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response remains a risk. Often its negotiators on all levels up to the minis-
ter will publicly demonize the decision, the Presidency, the Commission 
and all the partners consenting to the final compromise. This member state 
gives its authorities a pretext to prevent or delay the implementation (as a 
result of the “well understood” national interest). Furthermore, it may be 
driven by the public opinion to an action in the European Court of Justice.  
Those who agree to a decision in Brussels will defend it publicly. They 
cannot voice complaints later, even if they encounter problems at home due 
to this decision. A member state which has agreed despite all reservations 
will ensure that this decision is implemented in due time by its authorities. 
It will generally not be ready to jeopardize this decision later with an action 
in the European Court of Justice. The existence and effect of a legal act 
adopted by a majority is thus legally and politically less secure than that of 
a legal act adopted unanimously.
23 
Last but not least, after negotiating a politically difficult dossier and finally 
voting for a decision it is better to come home with a unanimous decision, 
than with a decision taken only by the majority. It is always easier to pre-
sent a unanimous decision than a majority vote at home because in this case 
nobody can accuse me of having made a possibly contentious decision with 
my vote. In a legal sense, our votes did not count any more. Hence we our-
selves were not the cause of potentially undesirable consequences (as op-
posed to a decision taken by qualified majority which was only possible 
thanks to our votes). On the contrary, we followed national interests by 
“selling” our votes. This is a valid argument in discussions with politicians 
and with business representatives who are dissatisfied with the decision. It 
is very useful if a negotiator is criticised by the opposition in a Committee 
of its national parliament or in a meeting of a lobbying association.  
 
23   The implementation of the Directive 92/43/EEC on the conservation of natural habitats and wild 
fauna and flora (Habitats Directive) was a problem for more than a decade in member states hav-
ing voted against it. At the end of the crucial Banana-dossier Denmark voted in favour despite 
strong reservations and did not bring an action in the Court; Germany voted against and brought 
an action due to internal pressure. Adopting the Hormone Directive the United Kingdom voted 
against and brought an action in the Court; Germany voted in favour even if it had taken a fun-
damentally different legal view up to that date and did not bring an action. 
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Hence all negotiators are anxious that all participants agree on an EU deci-
sion, if possible, even if this is not legally required.  That is why the major-
ity supporting the decision, as well as the Presidency and the Commission 
“reward” a hesitant member state getting on board at a late stage. This is an 
important characteristic of EU decision making and for the successful con-
duct of negotiations in the EU. This characteristic is often misjudged and as 
a result a lot of negotiating options remain unused. A good negotiator never 
definitively says “no”. As long as he has not definitively said “no” and as 
long as his negotiating partners hope to get him on board they will listen to 
his arguments and take them into account if possible. They are prepared to 
pay to get him on board. Those who do not make use of this option do not 
realise their negotiating potential. 
A negotiator who rejects a certain project is always faced with the question 
of whether in the final analysis it would’ve been better to eventually sup-
port it in order to influence negotiations in his direction. He has the choice. 
If he does not agree and sticks to his previous argument, this makes the 
domestic debate easier and keeps the option of taking legal action against 
the decision open. However, if he is prepared to eventually accept the deci-
sion he can make use of this willingness as part of the negotiated issues 
aiming to get some side payment. The question is always the same: which 
negotiating option do I have and which of these options is best for me or 
for my country?  
For instance, negotiating to reduce the pollution of coal energy plants we 
are confronted with a proposal that envisages a maximum standard of 100. 
Since our government is more environmentally ambitious, one option for us 
is to demand a maximum standard of 60 and to stick to this position until 
the end, even if this demand is unrealistic since the majority rejects a 
maximum standard below 80. Due to our definitive opposing attitude we 
will probably drive home with a very bad result, perhaps with a standard 
above 80, as the chairman knows that he cannot get our votes for a realistic 
solution. Hence he must try to get the necessary votes from other delega-
tions. Therefore, he will agree with these delegations on a solution which is 
to their benefit and our detriment.  
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There is a second option which is much better: To demand a reduction of 
the pollution as far as reasonably possible with a maximum standard of 60, 
but not reject other solutions from the outset. Then to constructively par-
ticipate in the negotiations taking into account the interests of the opposing 
countries and helping them to get on board. At the end of the day to get a 
standard of 80, or 70 or even 60 and some side payment - thanks to this 
constructive participation and to the prospect of our eventual agreement is a 
much better alternative. 
It is customary procedure in the EU that if a delegation makes it clear that it 
will not accept a decision under any circumstances, the Presidency, the 
Commission and the other Member States do not only negotiate without 
them but even against them. This is quite understandable because the quali-
fied majority can only be achieved by making concessions to other member 
countries which are disadvantageous toward the refusing Member State. 
It’s truly winner takes all. Therefore, it is an indicator of good negotiating 
skills that most EU decisions that could be taken by qualified majority are 
adopted unanimously. Generally, to reject definitively an agreement and to 
vote against a decision is a sign of having not fully used all of our negotiat-
ing opportunities.  
Of course it is possible that the internal political situation does not allow an 
EU negotiator to agree to a decision which cannot be avoided due to major-
ity proportions. Due to clear prior political positions and pressure from as-
sociations and the public, a government may believe that it has to reject the 
Commission’s proposal even if it was going to be largely amended to its 
benefit. If for domestic policy reasons we ultimately cannot vote with the 
majority, it is still much better from the perspective of negotiating tactics to 
abstain than to vote against the decision. From a domestic policy view, this 
can often still be justified especially if we record our divergent arguments 
for public consumption during the proceedings of the negotiations. We can 
also obtain some “reward” for our abstention. For all negotiators our ab-
stention is more desirable than an outright rejection. In contrast to a rejec-
tion, a decision on EU legislation is considered “unanimously” accepted if 
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one or more delegations abstain.
24 Thus, if we know that we will not be 
able to agree to a decision for internal policy reasons and would rather ab-
stain, we should inform the Presidency and the Commission and individual 
delegations: They should be given the opportunity to “reward” our efforts 
to avoid rejection.  
 
3.  Role of the European Commission 
3.1  Monopoly on proposals 
EU legislative acts may only be adopted on the basis of a Commission pro-
posal, except when the Treaties provide otherwise.
25 In principle, the Euro-
pean Parliament and the Council being the legislators of the EU can only 
take legislative decisions if the Commission has submitted a proposal. The 
Commission has a monopoly on proposals. Nobody except the Commission 
can initiate a legislative procedure in the EU. In fact, no Member State, nor 
the Council, nor the European Parliament, nor the European Council, can 
initiate legislation even if there is unanimity.
26 It is difficult to see any other 
comparable monopoly on initiatives, either in national legislative proce-
dure, or at the international level. This monopoly is the corner stone of the 
“méthode communautaire” and is a crucial characteristic of the EU deci-
sion-making process. It is the first important element of the Commission’s 
strong bargaining position. For it endows the Commission with the possi-
bility to decide which interests will be taken into account when shaping its 
legislative proposal. This right of the Commission is far-reaching in terms 
of contents. It comprises the substantive content of the proposed rule, its 
legal form (e.g. regulation, directive, decision) and the legal basis. 
 
24   See the “constructive effect” of abstentions in Art. 238 par. 4 TFEU: “abstentions ... shall not 
prevent the adoption ... of acts which require unanimity“. 
25   Art. 17 par. 2 TEU. 
26   The Lisbon Treaty has reaffirmed this quasi-monopoly over the formal initiative, though the 
Commission has to share the right of political initiative with the European Council, Art. 15 TEU, 
the EP, Art. 225 TFEU, the Council, Art. 241 TFEU, and the civil society, Art. 11 par.4 TEU. 
National parliaments now collectively have a de facto power to veto European Commission leg-
islative. This “yellow” and “orange” card procedure aims to ensure respect for the subsidiary 
principle. TFEU, Prot. 2. 
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3.2  Modifying and withdrawing proposals 
The second element of the Commission’s strong bargaining position is its 
privileged possibility to modify and to withdraw a proposal. As long as the 
Council has not acted, the Commission may alter its proposal at any time. 
Legally, the Council may also alter a Commission’s proposal at any time. 
But in principle, the Council can only deviate from the Commission’s pro-
posal if it reaches unanimity on a different content, on the legal form and 
the legal basis (Art 293 par. 1 and 2 TFEU)
27, which is hardly possible in 
practice.  
It is extremely rare that the Council adopts a rule derogating unanimously 
from the Commission’s proposal. The preconditions for this are practically 
impossible to create as the Commission does not make its proposals in a 
vacuum. It places them in such a way as to benefit at least some Member 
States. As a rule these Member States are not prepared to support an 
amendment to the Commission proposal, which would be detrimental to 
them. The Commission can also always try to buy out Member States who 
intend on opposing its proposal.  
Of course, the Commission can change its proposal in the course of the 
procedure of negotiations. But for a practitioner - a negotiator, a lobbyist - 
it would be utterly reckless to rely on this. Even if the responsible Commis-
sion official can be persuaded that the proposal must be amended, these 
amendments are usually very hard to achieve inside the Commission and 
can only be tabled with an uncertain result. This is due to the complex pro-
cedure inside the Commission. Indeed, this is the reason why national ex-
perts often come home from negotiations to their capitals accusing the 
Commission’s officials as being inflexible, impolite, arrogant and even 
“autistic”. We must not excuse impoliteness and arrogance, but as negotia-
tors we have to understand how the Commission’s representatives are and 
have to be as they are.  
This shows clearly that we must start to negotiate as soon as possible be-
fore the negotiations are officially opened, i.e.in concrete terms even before 
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the Commission has submitted its proposal. As every Commission proposal 
exerts a decisive influence on the course and outcome of negotiations, it 
must be our aim that the proposal takes our interests into account. How-
ever, this is ignored again and again. If a Commission proposal protects our 
interests, this places us in a favorable position. It only requires our negoti-
ating skill to prevent changes which are negative for us. This is because in 
all the following negotiations the Commission representatives will defend 
the proposal and thus indirectly our interests with their authority and their 
claim of representing the collective interest of the EU.  
If in an individual case the majority conditions necessitate an amendment 
to the proposal that is not in our interests, we are still in a far better position 
than if the Commission proposal had not taken our interests into account. 
The amendments appear as a kind of sacrifice for our position. This sacri-
fice should be offset by favorable arrangements on other points. As a result, 
we do not have to pay the others for the amendments, but the others have to 
pay us. Again as soon as possible, we must voice our interests even before 
the proposal is drafted or, even better before the Commission officials seri-
ously start working on it. In this phase they do not yet have a determined 
position, and they can be better influenced. It is our “first-mover advan-
tage”.
28 On the other hand, they cannot take our position into account if 
they do not know it. We have to act in time. We have to bring up our inter-
ests before the proposal is made. Once the Commission has tabled a pro-
posal, it is too late to bring up our interests. We must therefore strive to 
bring up our interests before the proposal is made.  
For this we need contacts in the Commission units. These contacts can be 
established in all possible ways: visits, phone calls, letters or sending mate-
rial like position papers, formulation aids, expert opinions or statistics. The 
lowest level is often the most important (decentralised, numerous, near to 
the subject, easy to reach).  Contact can also be established indirectly. It is 
effective, for instance, when a MEP or his assistant makes our interest 
 
27   Or if it adopts the EP opinion in every detail in the Conciliation Procedure Art. 294 par. 13 
TFEU. 
28   For the analysis of complex EU legislative decision making with the view of the game theory 
see: De Groot, Tjeerd, Dertien is een boerendozijn. Decision Making in the EU-Agricultural 
Council on Reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy, Delft 1997. 
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heard in the Commission units. Associations representing our interests are 
also useful. The Permanent Representations can establish contacts for us 
and act on our behalf. At the political level we can exert influence on the 
Commissioners and their cabinets. Furthermore, we can invite Commission 
officials to our country, our organisation, or our company to show them our 
positions and promote our interests.  
There are an unlimited number of possibilities to make our interests clear to 
the Commission. We can participate in the expert and working parties 
which advise the Commission when it prepares proposals. If we cannot par-
ticipate in the work ourselves we should at least show interest and influ-
ence those who are working in the groups. There is always a possibility to 
do so. The preparatory work of the Commission is much more transparent 
than often supposed.
29 However, our work must always be done on time. It 
is a bad negotiating style if you do not respond on time and then lament a 
bad Commission proposal and make the Commission the scapegoat.  In 
fact, such a stance could be disastrous.  
3.3  Other elements strengthening the negotiating power of the 
Commission 
There are many more particularities underlining the important negotiating 
power of the Commission: The Commission has the best possible access to 
all information at both the national and EU levels. It has the upper hand as 
an objective body, while the rest of the negotiators are often viewed as self-
ish. It has the role of custodian of the general interest of the Union, while 
the rest of the negotiators often defend national interests. It often slips into 
the role of defender of the interests of the smaller Member States, while the 
rest of the negotiators are seen as against the smaller Member States. The 
Treaty the Commission has the role as custodian of EU law and EU legisla-
tion (Art. 17 par.1 TEU, Art. 258 TFEU).  The Commission therefore has 
the possibility to reward good negotiating behaviour. All of this underlines 
the important negotiating powers of the Commission. It underlines how 
important it is for us to negotiate on good terms with the Commission. 
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Even after the proposal is tabled we want to have the Commission as an 
ally, not as an enemy. 
4.  Role of the European Parliament 
4.1  The other legislative body 
Today the EP together with the Council plays a decisive role in EU legisla-
tion. Its influence has never been as strong as it is now with the Lisbon 
Treaty. The Lisbon Treaty continued to extend Parliaments formal powers 
in the legislative process. Today the “ordinary legislative procedure”, for-
merly the “co-decision procedure”, gives the EP and the Council equal re-
sponsibility for the adoption of legislation. This procedure applies to most 
policy areas of the EU since the Lisbon Treaty including Home and Justice 
Affairs, the Common Agricultural and Fisheries Policies, the Common 
Commercial Policy, intellectual property rights and measures necessary for 
the use of the euro as the single currency. Here the Parliament is now a true 
legislative body on an equal footing with the Council.  
4.2 Ordinary  Legislative  Procedure 
As legislator, the EP acts together with the Council on the basis of a pro-
posal the Commission has submitted to them simultaneously. In a first and 
second reading the Parliament and the Council try to find a joint position. If 
Council and Parliament cannot agree on a piece of proposed legislation, it 
is put before the ”Conciliation Committee” composed of representatives of 
the Council and equal number of members representing the European Par-
liament. The Commission shall take part in the Conciliation Committee’s 
proceedings and shall take all necessary initiatives to reconcile the posi-
tions of the Parliament and the Council. Once this committee has reached 
an agreement on a joint text, this text is sent once again to the Parliament 
and the Council with a view to finally adopting it as law. 
 
 
29   E. g. calls for expression of interest to participate in the preparatory bodies in the Official Journal 
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4.3 Our  possibilities 
Not all national delegates acting in Council or Commission bodies seem to 
know that the EP is a decisive negotiating partner. This is understandable 
insofar as the EP is not directly involved in their negotiations. The repre-
sentatives of the EP don’t work in the same meeting rooms.  Most of the 
delegates don’t see an opportunity to come in contact with members of the 
EP. 
Even with only indirect contact, it would be very shortsighted for a negotia-
tor to neglect the EP’s far reaching influence on EU legislation. First of all, 
a negotiator must always be informed about the direction in which the EP 
probably will proceed. For this direction may strengthen or weaken his own 
bargaining position in his group or committee. It is easier to defend one’s 
own interests when they jive with the arguments of the majority in the EP 
rather than against them.   
Secondly the national delegate must know how to influence the decision 
making process in the EP and its composite bodies. The Presidency and the 
Commission are in contact with the EP at an early stage. To make the co-
decision procedure work, they meet in “Trialogues”. These meetings are 
not provided for in the treaties but have become more and more useful and 
routine in practice. They are effective because they take place at an early 
stage of the decision making process and usually only a few representatives 
participate. The early mutual exchange of information, the limitation of 
participants, the informal character and the common interest in compromis-
ing have reinforced cooperation particularly between Council and Parlia-
ment. So today most legislative acts passed in the co-decision procedure 
are adopted without a formal conciliation. Therefore, we must follow the 
early steps of this cooperation and try to influence it.  
For a negotiator it is important to know that the major part of the detailed 
work of the EP is done within its 22 policy-specialized standing commit-
tees and two special committees. Their composition reflects that of the Par-
liament as a whole. Members do not sit in national groups as in the Council 
 
and on the internet. 
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bodies, but in political groups. Here all legislative proposals are examined 
under a high level of autonomy. Only one committee is responsible for a 
proposal although other committees may contribute. Only its amendments 
to the proposal are considered in the plenary. A “rapporteur”, appointed by 
this committee, follows the proposal to the conclusion of the procedure. He 
contacts the “shadow rapporteurs”, appointed by the other political groups 
for this item. On the basis of the work and the report of the rapporteur, the 
responsible committee adopts its position that will normally prevail in the 
plenary. So the rapporteur and – to a less degree - the shadow rapporteurs 
are highly influential and the main targets of all those who want to influ-
ence the shape of a proposal.
30 We should make as early as possible profit 
of the negotiating possibilities this procedure offers.  
5.  Role of the Presidency 
5.1  Fixing programs and procedures 
Every six months another Member state assumes the Presidency in the 
Council bodies of the EU. The Presidency fixes the program of work for 
the Council and all its preparatory bodies during this six-month term and 
provides the chairpersons in all Council bodies. The respective chairperson 
of a Council working party draws up the program for his group and the 
agenda for each meeting, chairs the meeting, allows others to take the floor, 
decides if and when a vote is taken and can submit compromise proposals. 
This chairperson therefore has a lot of influence. For this reason it is impor-
tant that the delegate knows the rights and duties of the chair. He must also 
know which options exist for exerting influence on the Presidency and the 
chair.
31 However, all of this is not a particularity of EU bodies. It is more or 
less the same in all organizations where you have a chairmanship or a 
presidency, like public authorities as well as football clubs.  
 
30   Peterson, John; Shackleton, Michael (ed.), The Institutions of the European Union, Oxford 2006, 
p.112f. 
31   All of this can be gathered from the Council's Rules of Procedure of 15.09.2006, OJ 2006 L 
285/47. Key conclusions for the chairperson of the individual body are set out in the "Council 
Guide- Presidency Handbook". See Tallberg, 2006, p. 82 ff., Westlake and Galloway, p.325ff. 
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5.2  Antipode of the Commission 
However, due to the peculiarities of decision-making in the EU, the influ-
ence of the chairman goes far beyond what a chairman might otherwise 
have in multilateral negotiations. This is not however laid out in the Coun-
cil’s Rules of Procedure. His especially strong position results as a reflex to 
the strong position of the Commission on the one hand and the fragmenta-
tion of the influence of the individual Member States on the other hand. A 
single Member State alone cannot prevent a Commission proposal, nor can 
it assert a different opinion alone. Even though several Member States, 
whose votes suffice for a blocking minority, can prevent a proposal, they 
cannot put through an arrangement deviating from the proposal.  
A qualified majority of Member States can accept or reject the proposal of 
the Commission. However, as the composite Member States largely pursue 
different interests, it is extremely difficult for them to agree on an arrange-
ment against a Commission proposal (phenomenon of "atomization" of 
member state influence in EU decision making). As a rule, it is difficult for 
the Commission to amend proposals (see above). From the Commission's 
negotiating table, it is also very doubtful whether it would be advisable to 
amend its proposal. This is because amendments which do not result in a 
qualified majority for its proposal are useless concessions from the Com-
mission's perspective. Furthermore, they often provoke further demands 
and therefore they are- from the point of view of the Commission - coun-
terproductive. 
This is why the Presidency has such a particularly important role in the EU 
decision-making process. It is the sole instance where pooling Member 
State influence and can be effective toward the Commission. Thus in the 
EU decision-making process, the Presidency is the antipode of the Com-
mission. While the Commission has to stick to its proposal the Presidency 
can be more flexible.  Its role is to be an honest broker. In this sense it can 
be more objective and more independent than the Commission.  It has a 
very constructive and useful role to play. In practice, difficult negotiations 
in the EU are mostly concluded on the basis of compromise proposals 
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made by the Presidency.
32 Thus we have to find and use all opportunities to 
make the Presidency our ally. We must keep the chairman and his staff 
precisely informed about our own interests and arguments. We have to help 
them to understand what we want and need for only this enables the Presi-
dency to be “our” broker and to cover our interests by its compromise pro-
posal. The meetings are short and so the possibilities to act there are 
limited. Therefore, we must keep in touch with the Presidency both before 
and after meetings.  
Six months is a very short time, therefore we have to act accordingly. We 
have to make the Presidency our ally long before its presidency starts. 
Good personal relations must be built up for this in advance. This is best 
achieved before the beginning of the Presidency. Once his Presidency be-
gins the new chairman has much less time for you than before. Since 2006, 
the one member state holding the presidency is linked to the other two 
holders of the presidency as a “trio presidency”.
33 This facilitates the dele-
gations continuously having the best possible relations to the presidency. It 
is never too early, but often too late. Again the old rule applies; it is easiest 
to win somebody as a friend or an ally when you don't urgently need him. 
6.  Diversity of national interests 
6.1  Understanding the interests of our partners 
Generally speaking, negotiating successfully means bringing different in-
terests into line. In order to do so, one needs to understand the interests of 
the negotiating partners and make sure the partners understand one's own 
interests. If two people negotiate the sale of a used car their interests are 
quite clear: The seller would like to get a high price or at least does not 
want to sell his or her car below the price that he or she could get from an-
other buyer. The buyer would like to buy the car at a cheap price or at least 
 
32   The meeting of Commission working parties and committees are chaired by the Commission 
itself. Thus there is no “Presidency” as the antipode to the Commission. There is no honest bro-
ker making effective the member state influence versus the Commission. That is one reason why 
national delegates often feel lost in the Commission’s bodies particularly. 
33   Council’s amended Rules of Procedure: "Every 18 months, the three Presidencies due to hold 
office shall prepare, in close cooperation with the Commission, and after appropriate consulta-
tions, a draft programme of Council activities for that period." 
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it should not be more expensive than a comparable car he or she could buy 
somewhere else. This is not as clear in EU negotiations. Here it is much 
more difficult to find out the interests of our partners and to assess them 
correctly. It is also much more difficult to make our partners understand 
our own interests. There are several reasons for this. 
6.1.1  Broad spectrum of interests 
One reason is that the spectrum of interests of 27 delegations participating 
in EU negotiations is often very broad. If there are different opinions in the 
EU bodies, the delegates usually present their opposing positions only. 
Rarely do we know which interests they really pursue with the positions 
they present. However, these interests are the decisive factor.  
For instance, if  the Commission has tabled a proposal for an EU rule for 
immigration from a crisis region, it does make a difference whether a dele-
gation objects because it fears disadvantages for its domestic economy, a 
burden to its own labour market, a burden to the national budget or an 
alienation from the culture of its own country. Maybe the planned rule 
would cause a special problem in the constituency of the negotiating minis-
ter. Or perhaps a delegation's rejection of a proposal just results from a 
misunderstanding. 
In its package for the Agenda 2000, the EU Commission proposed, inter 
alia, an expensive reform to the organisation of the wine market. The min-
isters of several northern Member States put up fierce resistance. Obvi-
ously, because of their climates, none of these countries represented any 
wine-growing interests. However, the motivation for their rejection differed 
sharply. Yet all of them represented typical interests of their countries. The 
Presidency had to recognise these interests and take them into account in its 
compromise proposals. In collaboration with the Commission, it found the 
following motives: One minister pursued financial interests, as not a single 
Euro out of the billions which were to be spent for the support and the re-
orientation of the wine market would have gone to his country. Another 
minister under the same climatic conditions, however, was not concerned at 
all about financial consequences. His concern was that the southern pro-
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ducers of wine and brandy might gain a competitive advantage over the 
Irish producers of whiskey and beer, resulting in a drop in sales. One minis-
ter wanted to prevent any new expensive regulation of the wine market as 
he was in the middle of an election campaign and had agreed to spearhead 
a public campaign against the consumption of alcohol. One minister was 
not interested at all in the proposal. He put up resistance only because he 
needed negotiation power vis-à-vis the wine-growing Member States, the 
Presidency and the Commission to push through his own demands in other 
parts of the Agenda 2000.
34 
6.1.2  Restrictions in the meeting room 
Another reason for the difficulty in understanding stems from the fact that 
only a small part of a partner's real interest emerges; much like the tip of an 
iceberg. It is necessary and, through active negotiating, also possible to find 
out, to realise and to understand the remaining part. We can only find out 
the real interests of the other negotiating partners if we approach them. 
During the official meeting in the conference room this is almost impossi-
ble. Here, every delegation keeps repeating its position. Astute questions in 
the circle of 27 Member States leads to a repetition of the old position – 
perhaps in other words but old nevertheless. Today, in the EU 27 however, 
you even don’t have the speaking time to ask your partners. 
But in the margins of the meeting's official course, however, this is differ-
ent. If we speak with our partners during a break of the meeting they will 
say more than in the formal meeting. They can hardly read out their speak-
ing notes to us once again. Maybe they will explain their position once 
again, leading to new points of departure that help us understand their real 
interests. In particular, we can question what is really behind some of their 
arguments. We will be more successful outside the conference room. It is 
usually easy to find out the interests of your partner while having a cup of 
coffee at the coffee bar, or a common lunch in the canteen or pizzeria, or a 
glass of beer in the next pub.  
 
34   For the extremely complex bargaining package of the Agenda 2000 as a whole see Westlake and 
Galloway, p.277ff. 
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What is important is that we as negotiators are able to recognize a problem. 
When we Europeans negotiate with people coming from totally different 
cultural backgrounds like the Japanese or Saudis for example, the problem 
is self-evident. However, in EU negotiations many people believe that they 
fully understand their partners and their partners’ interests. This leads to 
open and hidden dissents and "unexplained" negotiation blockades. This is 
why we should keep assuming that each and every one of our negotiating 
partners is an "unknown person", even if we have known him or her for 
years. We have to keep trying to put ourselves in our partner's shoes and 
look behind the façade. It is always necessary to make additional efforts to 
recognize the real interests. 
Sometimes it is helpful to think of the typical interests of the member state 
in question. In the negotiations about any EU measure that has an impact 
on the budget, a net contributor to the EU's budget, like Great Britain, the 
Netherlands, Denmark, Germany or Sweden, has other interests in mind 
than a member state which gets much more from the EU's budget. Member 
States that are geographically situated on the periphery of the EU are al-
ways interested in avoiding possible disadvantages resulting from their pe-
ripheral position or in getting compensated for it regardless of the effect on 
centrally situated Member States.  
Often, however, this is not enough to clearly discern specific interests. 
Then, the Council Secretariat, the Commission's services and our Perma-
nent Representation are important information sources. Particularly, the 
representative of the Council Secretariat is usually experienced in the dos-
sier and has established good contacts with all delegations, and therefore 
knows their interests.  
6.2  Explaining our own interests 
As important as understanding the interests of our partners is, it is impor-
tant to make our partners understand our own interests. This means much 
more than just repeating our own position all the time. We have to disclose 
our interests proactively. We must approach the other parties including the 
other delegations, the Commission, the Presidency and so on (in the mar-
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gins of the meetings, in bilateral meetings with individual delegations, with 
representatives of the Commission, with representatives of the Council Se-
cretariat or via the Permanent Representation) in order to achieve this. We 
must talk, call, write and travel. Our partners are interested in knowing 
what we think, want and need. Information is our capital. 
Thus we must never try to negotiate with a poker face. How could our part-
ners know what we think, want and what we need if we keep the visor of 
the helmet closed? Once again, we have to act at an early stage. In EU ne-
gotiations it is always better to disclose one's interests early on. Only then 
do we have the chance to have our interests taken into account. Usually it is 
too late if a majority emerges before we have presented and explained our 
interests. We have to assert our interests and not a position. For the Mem-
ber State, interests are stable. The Member State position has to develop as 
negotiations develop. 
7.   Cultural  diversity 
The cultural diversity of the EU and the cultural differences between the 
Member States are often seen as a particularity that has to be taken into ac-
count strictly by EU negotiators. EU negotiators have made different al-
lowances as the EU became bigger and bigger with each enlargement. 
Therefore, the fact that our ways of thinking and expressing ourselves dif-
fer from our partners' makes it harder to understand and correctly assess 
their various. We are not used to the way our partners behave. Some things 
seem strange to us. When we negotiate with people coming from totally 
different geographical and cultural backgrounds we know the problem. In 
EU negotiations many people believe that they fully understand their part-
ners and their interests. As useful as the knowledge of these differences is 
and as interesting the vast literature on this item may be in general, in prac-
tice this item is much less important than often expected.  
First of all, the country-specific characteristics of our EU partners are less 
strange for us than those of negotiation partners from totally different geo-
graphical and cultural backgrounds. However, in an EU 27 it is impossible 
to know the cultural characteristics of all our 26 partners and to take them 
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into account. Fortunately, it is not really necessary. In EU negotiations, the 
characteristics of each country have become decreasingly important and 
diluted, the more the EU has grown. They have been replaced by the nego-
tiation particularities of the EU as a whole. To know these particularities 
and to draw the appropriate conclusions from them is the “cross-cultural 
competence” we need in negotiating EU law.
35  
8. Diversity  of  languages, EU language regime 
8.1  Being aware of problems  
Those who negotiate at an international level expect that linguistic prob-
lems might arise. Those who negotiate in a foreign language know that this 
is a risk as nobody can express himself in a foreign language as well, pre-
cise and rich in subtleties as in a native language. We do encounter these 
problems in the EU bodies too, but they are not characteristics of EU nego-
tiations. Here we have other linguistic problems. In an important part of the 
EU bodies, every delegate speaks in his own native language, and relevant 
texts must generally be available in all 23 EU official and working lan-
guages. A great number of excellent interpreters and translators see to that. 
This is because under Art. 1 of Regulation No. 1 determining the languages 
to be used by the EU, the languages of all Member States are equal official 
languages and working languages of the EC bodies.
36  
Thus it is not the diversity of languages which characterizes EU negotia-
tions, but rather the language coverage in its bodies which distinguishes EU 
negotiations from other international negotiations. As convenient as this 
full-language coverage might be, it harbors risks we must realize and take 
into account. Otherwise these risks will turn into serious problems. First of 
all we have to accept that due to the full language coverage, many good 
 
35   On the other hand it is the country-specific interest of each member state which remains of par-
ticular importance in EU negotiations; see above chapter 2.2. 
36   Art. 342 TFEU; Regulation (EEC) No. 1, 15.04.1958, OJ 1958, p. 385, last amended by Regula-
tion (EC) No. 920/2005, OJ 2005 L 156, p.1; Art. 14 of the Council's Rules of Procedure of 15 
September 2006, OJ 2006 L 285/47. Given the nearly doubled number of official EU languages 
as a result of the enlargement, since 2004 the “request-and-pay” system has been introduced in a 
part of the Council preparatory bodies. Under this system member states may choose whether or 
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pieces of advice from books on rhetoric are of no use in the EU negotia-
tions. Our negotiating partners do not hear us directly, but only their inter-
preters. Our sophisticated body language is ineffective because it does not 
match the interpretation. And our rhetorically excellent statements are not 
correctly received by the addressee because they were expressed by our-
selves in a way which makes it impossible for the interpreters to fully un-
derstand them. Many a delegate speaking in his native language in the EU 
conference room apparently assumes he is speaking directly and in his own 
language with the delegates of the other Member States. In fact, at first he 
is speaking with an interpreter he does not see. At best this interpreter will 
speak with another delegate in his native language. Frequently, this inter-
preter is first speaking with another interpreter who interprets the already 
interpreted contribution to the negotiation again and passes it on to the ac-
tual addressee (“relay interpreting”). Obviously, this interpretation by 
“Chinese Whispers”
37 increases the risk of message distortions, omissions 
and mistakes. The participants in this “communication” never directly 
speak with each other and often cannot even see each other in the confer-
ence room. Naturally the delegates focus exclusively on the texts in their 
native language. However, these texts have been – directly or via other lan-
guages – translated from the language of the original text by an interpreter, 
who might be highly proficient linguistically, but who may not understand 
the matter at hand. Since he or she does not know the previous course of 
negotiations, he or she would find it hard to understand and translate the 
subtleties of the text and the negotiations.  
Furthermore, the full-language coverage increases the usual risk of misun-
derstandings in negotiations. In practice, "inexplicable" disagreements and 
blockades in the negotiations occur again and again. They are so dangerous 
because we do not expect these risks here due to the convenience of the 
full-language coverage. The full-language coverage leads to misunder-
standings at all levels. Even at the level of the Heads of State and Govern-
ment surprising problems arise even though the best professional 
 
not they wish to have interpretation services provided in their own language in a particular pre-
paratory body. 
37   “Stille Post”, “Telephone”, “Le telephone arab”. 
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negotiators had prepared for the meeting for months. What is true for inter-
pretations holds true for translation too. The Council witnessed bitter dis-
cussions because the word "no" figured in the English version, in which the 
compromise proposal of the chairmanship was formulated. It was missing 
in the version passed on to the translators, and it was therefore also missing 
in the translated texts with which the delegations worked. It can take hours 
of negotiations before this kind of error is noticed. 
8.2 Avoiding  problems 
Due to the opportunities for misunderstandings, we have to be aware of 
problems. On the one hand, we have to make our own contributions trans-
latable. We must use simple language, short sentences, verb first format, 
slow speech with pauses and repetition of key statements. We have to es-
tablish contacts with interpreters and translators send them technical texts 
in advance and be available for questions relating to understanding. The 
Commission’s Directorate General for Interpretation gives the following 
“Tips for speakers with interpreters”. Speak your mother tongue, if possi-
ble. Speak naturally, at a reasonable pace. Speaking freely or on the basis 
of notes is better than reading. If you read out prepared texts or statements, 
please ask the Secretariat to ensure that copies are distributed beforehand to 
all the interpreters’ booths. Quote document references. Make figures, 
names and acronyms clear. Explain rare acronyms. Talk to your interpret-
ers and give them feedback.
38  
The last point may cause you to bring yours or your minister’s speaking 
notes to the interpreters. We will always profit from doing that. It is true 
what the General Directorate “Interpretation” promises: information and 
copies given to EU interpreters are always treated with the utmost confi-
dentiality and checked against delivery. On the other hand, we have to 
check important texts in other languages especially if "inexplicable" differ-
ences arise. We should always expect that misunderstandings could arise in 
the interpretation and translation. We have to listen to the interpretation of 
our contributions into the other languages. We should do it for our col-
 
38   eu.europa>dg interpretation>working with interpreters>tips for speakers; download 15.01.2011. 
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leagues, boss and minister. You should ask your colleagues to do so as well 
if you give a contribution. Since this is an item that seems so simple or 
even trivial for some negotiators, we have to point out these aspects as a 
reminder.  
9. Sustainability of negotiating relations 
9.1   Brussels network 
If you buy a used car via a newspaper ad you have a single and short nego-
tiating relationship with the buyer. Once the sales contract has been con-
cluded and settled, there is usually no continued communication between 
the negotiating parties. Negotiating relations in the EU tend to be perma-
nent and sustainable. If we negotiate today in a committee about regulation 
of environmental standards for coal energy plants, we could be negotiating 
about perhaps climate change or animal welfare next week. Presumably, 
we will be negotiating for several years in a row in our working party or 
our committee or in the Coreper. The same delegates negotiate together in 
most EU bodies for several years. This is particularly evident in the Core-
per where national delegates often stay for five to ten or for some, even 20 
years. Even when leaving his group or committee, the delegate will nor-
mally continue to work on EU items and thus stay in the “Brussels old 
boys’ network.  
9.2  Credibility is my capital 
If the seller of a used car has concealed a defect to the buyer, the sale may 
have a judicial consequence. But if buyer and seller do not know each other 
personally, there will be no further effects on the relations between the par-
ties. If a partner is dishonest in EU negotiations, this will have conse-
quences for all future negotiations. The trust between the negotiating 
partners is permanently destroyed. However the partners cannot avoid each 
other as they have to keep on negotiating together due to their tasks. So we 
must always be aware of the fact that our conduct in today's bargaining will 
influence the conduct of our partners in all future negotiations. It must 
therefore be our aim to improve the relations with our partners in every 
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bargaining situation and in every meeting, if possible. If this not possible, 
our conduct must on no account worsen this relationship. If we have to ar-
gue very firmly against another delegation, we should reflect on how we 
can still maintain our personal relationships and a basis of trust for the fu-
ture. We should always counter in a targeted way. This is best done on the 
fringes of a meeting. For example, we can inform our colleague delegate 
why we must take up position against him (due to national interests, politi-
cal commitments or instructions). Aiming not to worsen the relations to our 
partner, we should inform him if we have to leave a coalition with him dur-
ing an EU negotiation. Since the sudden U-turn of an ally may be painful 
for him. In EU negotiating, the ongoing relationship with our partners may 
be more important than the outcome of any particular negotiation or en-
forcement of a position in an individual case.
39 
The following should also be noted in this context. Once a delegation casts 
a vote in support of a decision, it must stick to it. Occasionally as a negotia-
tor you are tempted to withdraw your approval of a political agreement af-
ter having experienced trouble at home because of the approval and to 
prevent the still outstanding formal adoption. If you do this you will violate 
a taboo and lose your credibility in the long run. So if you are not sure that 
you are able to uphold your approval you should give the Presidency 
sufficient notice of your reservation.  Or you may give your approval “ad 
referendum” which indicates that your approval is still pending and will 
become definite once it is confirmed by your superiors or the responsible 
body. As the negotiating relations in the EU are marked by sustainability, 
mean tricks never pay off. They backfire on those using them. We must not 
risk burning our bridges. Since mutual trust can be strained or damaged for 
the future, one should renounce the use of tricks, threats and everything 
which might hurt other participants in the negotiation. This often includes 
avoiding a brisk bargaining style and even irony. On the other hand, due to 
the sustainability of relations, there is much less reason in EU negotiations 
than elsewhere to give in when somebody uses tricks or works with threats 
or undue pressure. It is sufficient to reveal this conduct, preferably in a 
 
39   Fisher and Ury, p.20. 
 43Klaus-Jörg Heynen 
form hurting the partner as little as possible, and hold the common interest 
against it.  
10.   Sustainable coalitions among Member States  
He who negotiates multilaterally needs allies. It is a great advantage if you 
have allies you can count on. Therefore, from the very beginning of the EU, 
Member States were seeking like-minded countries to possibly form per-
manent coalitions with. This applies to Belgium, the Netherlands and Lux-
embourg, using the Benelux Union as the first of these permanent 
coalitions. The EU countries bordering the Mediterranean are seen as a 
coalition if EU law with particular reference to the Mediterranean is con-
cerned. The Nordic Member States regularly coordinate common positions 
and meet before council meetings. The Member States joining the EU with 
the last enlargement were supposed to form a sustainable coalition. From 
time to time, new “permanent” coalitions are emerging in different policy 
fields with promising names.
40 The existence of such coalitions is often 
seen as a characteristic of EU decision making. 
10.1  Benefits, limits and risks 
Permanent or more or less regular negotiating coalitions are useful in the 
early stages of negotiations. They enable an early, uncomplicated exchange 
of ideas among like-minded people about a legislative project of mutual 
interest. They help us to understand the interests of other delegations early 
and to build up confidence. These coalitions also facilitate the formation of 
blocking minorities by countries with parallel interests. This is useful in 
terms of negotiating tactics. 
But we should also see the limits and risks of these coalitions. Most of 
them are less permanent and less effective than the participants might ex-
pect.
41 Usually, they only continue as long as they have not entered a deci-
sive stage in negotiations and before each delegation has determined its 
own interests. Afterward, they can easily break apart. At the end of bar-
 
40   E.g. “Gang of Four”, “Group of Five”, ”Capri Group”, “Club Med”. 
41   Hayes-Renshaw in Peterson and Shackleton, p.73. 
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gaining when you have to decide whether you will ultimately agree to a 
final compromise, only your own interests will matter.  
He who only talks with like-minded people obtains a unilateral and biased 
view. He overestimates his own position and potential agreement with his 
interests. Those who bring about a blocking minority with these negotiating 
coalitions must understand that this is only a partial victory. It usually is 
not enough to prevent a Commission proposal or a proposal made by the 
Presidency. In the end, a qualified majority must be gained for a proper so-
lution. There is another risk with coalitions, a group of Member States 
holding together their blocking minority to prevent an important regulation 
can easily build up a reputation for blackmail politics. A negotiating coali-
tion among neighboring countries is also fragile if one is big and the other 
small or if historical experience prompts one neighbor to demonstrate its 
independence. The relations between Great Britain and Ireland, Germany 
and Austria, Sweden and Finland and Spain and Portugal illustrate this 
concept. Earlier expectations that permanent negotiating coalitions might 
emerge between these neighboring countries have turned out misplaced.  
10.2 The  Franco-German  relationship 
A special example for a sustainable coalition may be the Franco-German 
partnership. There has been an institutionalized Franco-German coopera-
tion since the 1963 Elysée Treaty. According to this agreement, both coun-
tries should through intensive consultations, reach an aligned position 
regarding European issues. This is done through frequent Franco-German 
contacts at all levels. These contacts range from the technical level to that 
of the Heads of State. Apart from the cooperation among the Benelux coun-
tries, this formalized bilateral cooperation is unparalleled in the EU. Inci-
dentally, the Franco-German tandem has lost in importance in terms of 
voting. In the EC of six states, Germany and France formed a blocking mi-
nority. Nothing could be done in defiance of these two Member States. To-
day, Germany and France have only 58 votes at their disposal which is well 
short of the 91 votes needed for a blocking minority. Among the other 
permanent coalitions in the EU, the Franco-German coalition stands out 
because at all levels there appear to be few identical interests. Most of the 
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time, both partners seem to promote opposing interests.
42 Therefore, there 
are occasional crises between the partners which are covered extensively in 
the media which often declares the relationship dead. 
Yet this special relationship still plays a role in EU negotiations.
43 Contrary 
to some other negotiating coalitions, the coordination between France and 
Germany starts out with widely divergent interests on concrete issues. In 
other words, Germany and France often represent complementary interests. 
When Germany and France want to reach an agreement, they must regu-
larly reconcile the conflict of interests existing among all Member States. 
When France and Germany have agreed on a compromise despite widely 
varied interests at the beginning, as long as they can live with the solution, 
it is often seen as acceptable and advantageous to other Member States.
44 
This may be the reason why this special relationship has endured since the 
beginning of European integration and is often seen as positive by the other 
Member States regardless of public reservations and harsh criticism.
45 We 
should make sure to take this relationship into account in our negotiations.   
III. Conclusion 
We have identified some characteristics of the EU decision making process 
and drawn conclusions for our negotiating approach.  In principle, these 
characteristics are the same wherever EU decision making and negotiations 
take place including the working party and the senior preparatory bodies, 
the Council and the European Council. Negotiating EU law is a complex 
and often long process in which numerous players are involved. Only a 
small part of it is done in the conference room and during formal meetings. 
To be successful, we need an intelligent and realistic strategy which is de-
 
42   E.g. recently the open dispute at the highest level on the financial crisis of some EU countries till 
Merkel-Sarkozy’s beach promenade in Deauville October 2010. 
43   On the other hand the intended trilateral coalition France-Germany-Poland (Weimar triangle) has 
gained only low practical relevance. See Hilz and Robert, p.3ff. 
44   For bringing forward difficult negotiations by bringing together the extremes see Westlake and 
Galloway, p.227. 
45   E.g. the Luxembourg Foreign Minister Jean Asselborn after a Merkel-Sarkozy  pre-agreement in 
Deauville warning France and Germany against the ”claim to power showing a certain hubris 
and arrogance”, in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 16.12.2010, p.10:  “Scharfe Töne”. 
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veloped as early as possible and developed according to the progress. EU 
negotiations are not a matter of rhetorical skills; rather they are a manage-
ment task.  
It is always satisfying to get one’s own interests through by negotiating 
successfully. It is particularly satisfying when negotiating EU law. Here the 
negotiators most of whom are civil servants who don’t have senior posi-
tions have a privileged task and position. They are directly participating in 
the negotiations over EU legislation which will become directly applicable 
for nearly 500 million citizens. This is about much more than pushing 
through one’s own interests. The skills of all negotiators form the funda-
mental basis for a functioning and stable EU. By skillfully and successfully 
negotiating EU law, we can contribute to this and to the construction of the 
“new legal edifice …, a construction which will be in harmony with the 
requirements of these new times”. 
46 
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